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IN DEFENSE OF THE RESTATEMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
LAW 
Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue* 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of liability law to the American system of justice, and 
to the US economy in general, are well known. Somewhat less well known, 
at least among non-lawyers, is the corresponding centrality of liability insur-
ance.1 For most non-contractual legal claims for damages that are brought 
against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability insurance cover-
age. Such coverage, provided by state-regulated insurance companies, ranges 
from auto and homeowners’ policies (sold to consumers throughout the coun-
try) to commercial general liability policies (sold to businesses of all sizes) 
to professional liability policies of various sorts (including Directors and Of-
ficers coverage as well as legal and medical malpractice coverage). The Re-
statement of the Law Liability Insurance is the American Law Institute’s first 
effort to “restate” the common law governing all such liability insurance con-
tracts, and we are the reporters.2  
George Priest is a Professor at Yale Law School, where he has been 
teaching for over three decades. Within the legal academy, Priest is known 
best for his work on consumer product warranties,3 products liability law,4 
  
 * Tom Baker is the William Maul Measey Professor of Law and Health Sciences at the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School. Kyle Logue is the Douglas A. Kahn Collegiate Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Jay Feinman, Mark Geistfeld, Paul Heaton, Peter 
Siegelman, and Chaim Saiman for comments on a prior draft and Adam Scales, Jeffrey Stempel, and 
Jeffrey Thomas for helpful discussion.  
 1 See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008). 
 2 Tom Baker is the Reporter. Kyle Logue is the Associate Reporter. Most of the Restatement was 
approved in 2016, and the remainder was approved by the ALI Council in January 2017 and is ready for 
final approval in May 2017. Except where noted to the contrary, all citations to the Restatement of the 
Law Liability Insurance (“RLLI”) in this response are to Tentative Draft No. 1 (April 2016). 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW LIABILITY INSURANCE (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 2016) 
[hereinafter RLLI]. In the text we often refer to the RLLI as the “Restatement of Liability Insurance Law.” 
 3 E.g., George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).  
 4 E.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual 
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985)  
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antitrust law,5 and the economic analysis of the litigation and settlement pro-
cess.6 Among practitioners of insurance law, he is best known for his dec-
ades-long service as a leading expert witness for insurance companies in cov-
erage disputes against policyholders. In A Principled Approach Toward In-
surance Law: The Economics of Insurance and the Current Restatement Pro-
ject, published in the George Mason Law Review,7 Priest offers an aggressive 
and somewhat meandering attack on the Restatement. What follows is our 
response. 
Priest’s written critique of the Restatement, which he candidly acknowl-
edges was paid for by the American Insurance Association, contains bold 
(and, this essay will argue, groundless and unsubstantiated) assertions about 
the Restatement and about us. It goes on at length about basic principles of 
insurance economics that anyone who took microeconomics in college will 
remember, thereby not-so-subtly seeking to create the (erroneous) impres-
sion that the Restatement is somehow inconsistent with, and written in igno-
rance of, those economic principles. Further, it claims that the Restatement 
will undermine the stability of insurance markets. The basic structure of his 
argument can be summarized as follows:  
(1) In drafting the Restatement, Baker and Logue have chosen many 
new rules that radically depart from existing case law.8  
(2) These radical new rules have a clear “pro-policyholder” bias, a bias 
that is misguided because it is premised on mistaken assumptions about how 
insurance markets work and fails to take into account well-known principles 
of the “economics of insurance.”9 
(3) The radical pro-policyholder rules that Baker and Logue have pro-
posed will harm policyholders by causing liability insurance premiums to 
skyrocket and the availability of coverage to evaporate, harming all policy-
holders but especially the poor.10 
Our responses to these assertions are straightforward: 
(1) All of the rules adopted by the Restatement are grounded in existing 
case law. In that sense, none of them are new, and certainly none are radical. 
Most of the rules in the Restatement have in fact been adopted by a majority 
of the U.S. jurisdictions that have considered them. The Restatement follows 
a minority rule in only a few instances and only when the minority rule is 
better reasoned and will likely lead to better consequences than the alterna-
tives. This is a common practice among ALI Restatement projects.  
  
 5 E.g., George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309 (1977).  
 6 E.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984).  
 7 George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The Economics of Insurance 
and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635 (2017). 
 8 Id. at 636, 652–53.  
 9 Id. at 636 (noting that, although the Restatement has “toned down” its earlier aspirations, “it 
remains a strikingly pro-policyholder statement”). 
 10 Id. at 636–37.  
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(2) Like the law on which it is based, the Restatement is not premised 
on mistaken assumptions about how insurance markets work; nor does it fail 
to take account of basic principles of insurance economics. Instead, it is Priest 
who either misunderstands or intentionally ignores basic facts about insur-
ance markets. Specifically, Priest ignores the insights, accumulated over 
many decades now by psychologists and empirical economists, regarding 
how people actually behave, facts that are contrary to the largely discredited 
perfectly-rational-actor model on which Priest’s arguments are premised.11  
(3) Therefore, expanding the geographical application of the rules that 
the Restatement follows, thereby creates greater national uniformity in lia-
bility insurance law, and supports, not disrupts, insurance markets.  
(4) Finally, Priest provides no evidence to the contrary. Because all 
these rules, or some variant of them (in some cases, a more pro-policyholder 
alternative rule), have been adopted in some jurisdiction in this country, if 
those rules were disruptive to the market, there should be evidence of that 
fact in those jurisdictions. So far as we know, there is no such evidence.  
Liability insurance companies have access to the best data that could 
prove or disprove the claim that some of our proposed rules would cause 
premium spikes or availability “crises.”12 If the insurance industry truly be-
lieves that broader application of the rules adopted in the Restatement will 
harm liability insurance markets, it should provide disinterested empirical 
legal studies researchers with access to the data needed to test that belief, 
rather than simply attacking the Restatement. The researchers can then use 
the data to evaluate the comparative effects of the legal rules among which 
the Restatement is choosing. As an industry that prides itself on sophisticated 
use of data and analytics, insurers should embrace the use of data to assess 
which legal rules are economically efficient, rather than simply making 
claims when there is a paucity of empirical evidence. As economically and 
empirically minded legal scholars, we would welcome such evidence, and 
we expect that the American Law Institute would as well. 
The remainder of this essay develops these points in greater detail. In 
addition, it addresses the few specific sections of the Restatement that Priest 
has singled out for criticism, including the rules on misrepresentations, duty 
to defend, and duty to settle. With respect to those rules, Priest’s arguments 
are either wildly overstated or flatly wrong.13 
  
 11 See generally, RICHARD THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
(2016) (providing an entertaining memoir and introduction to behavioral economics by a founding father 
of the field). 
 12 See Tom Baker, Transparency Through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, in 
CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 191 (Joseph Doherty et 
al. eds., 2012) (discussing consequences for public knowledge of the civil justice system of the proprietary 
nature of liability insurance claims data). 
 13 For a more serious, scholarly analysis of an earlier draft of the Restatement, see the 2015 sympo-
sium issue of the Rutgers University Law Review. 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1 (2015).  
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I. THE RESTATEMENT IS BASED IN THE COMMON LAW 
Most of the readers of this essay will be familiar with the genre of the 
Restatement. Recall how a Restatement works. The most important part is 
the “black letter,” which consists of a collection of legal rules written in 
quasi-statutory language that are derived from reported judicial decisions, 
sometimes as informed by state statutes. Accompanying each set of black 
letter rules are “comments” that explain the details of how those rules oper-
ate, sometimes including illustrations applying the rules to simplified hypo-
thetical scenarios. The comments typically contain both the rationale for the 
rule and an explanation of how the rule fits into the broader common law. 
Following the comments are so-called “reporters’ notes,” which contain ci-
tations to the relevant court decisions on which the rules are grounded and 
secondary authority discussing those rules. 
The process through which a Restatement gets drafted is layered and 
time-consuming. A Restatement is not, as Priest’s essay implies, invented by 
the reporters.14 The reporters do write the initial drafts of the black letter, 
comments, and notes. But those drafts are then vetted multiple times by ad-
visory groups within the American Law Institute. These groups consist of 
experts in the relevant fields of law, including highly respected lawyers who 
have been practicing in those areas for many years, well-known judges who 
have decided important cases applying the relevant doctrine, and law profes-
sors who have been teaching and writing in the field for most of their careers.  
In our case, the advisory groups include experts both from the policy-
holder and the insurance industry side of the aisle. The members of these 
advisory groups make a range of suggestions, from advice about general top-
ics to address in the Restatement, to ideas about how to organize various sec-
tions, to specific wording suggestions for the black letter and the comments, 
to recommendations of cases that should be cited in the reporters’ notes for a 
given proposition or for citations that should be removed because the relevant 
case had been superseded or called into question.  
After considering all the input from all these experts, and after making 
the appropriate revisions, the reporters submit a draft to the council of the 
ALI for approval (at which stage the reporters often receive additional com-
ments that give rise to further revisions). Once the council has approved the 
document, the draft is submitted for still more discussion to the full member-
ship of the ALI, who then vote to approve (or not) the draft, sometimes of-
fering amendments. Typically, this process takes place over many years, as 
the reporters take drafts of portions of the Restatement through this iterative 
process. The creation of a Restatement, in sum, is a group effort that incor-
porates the collective wisdom of many of the best and most experienced legal 
and industry experts in the country.  
  
 14 See Priest, supra note 7, at 635–36. 
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The Restatement of Liability Insurance Law is no exception. The project 
began in 2010, initially as the “Principles of the Law of Liability Insurance.” 
The ALI’s Principles projects are addressed more to legislatures and are not 
required to be based in the existing common law. When it became clear that 
the rules were largely taking the form of a restatement of existing common 
law, however, the ALI Council decided to make the project a Restatement. 
As part of that process, some rules in the draft changed to be more in line 
with the existing common law.15 
The Restatement drafting process has produced 24 drafts presented for-
mally in just as many ALI meetings. It has prompted scores of written com-
ments filed formally with the ALI and even more comments provided directly 
to us. We have also discussed drafts at meetings of the American Bar Asso-
ciation’s Torts Trial and Insurance Practice Section and Litigation Section, 
the Defense Research Institute, and a committee of the American Insurance 
Association. In addition, the Rutgers Law School Center for Risk and Re-
sponsibility hosted a symposium on the project, attended by both law profes-
sors and practitioners, with papers published in the Rutgers Law Review.16 It 
would be a shock, then, if, after all of this process, the resulting rules would 
be wildly out of line with existing common law.  
And yet that is one of the primary claims in Priest’s essay. He says, for 
example, that the Restatement is “not generally reflective of the law in the 
various U.S. jurisdictions.”17 This statement is obviously meant to be a criti-
cism but is hard to pin down. At a minimum, it must mean that most, or at 
least many, of the rules adopted in the Restatement are contrary to the law in 
most states.  
Yet Priest fails to provide any evidence for this strikingly broad claim. 
In the footnotes that accompany the quote above, he says this: “This paper is 
meant to be conceptual and will not specifically address differences between 
the proposed rules and the law in the several jurisdictions though. As shall 
be occasionally indicated, there are many differences.”18 How can the paper 
be “conceptual” when one of its central claims is the empirical assertion that 
the Restatement is not generally reflective of the law in the various jurisdic-
tions? Further, why exactly will the paper “not address specific differences”? 
If one is going to make the not-generally-reflective-of-the-law claim about 
an entire Restatement project, is one not obligated to provide at least a few 
  
 15 See, e.g., RLLI, Reporters’ Memorandum xix–xx (Am. Law Inst., Discussion Draft, Apr. 2015) 
(listing changes made as a result of the new status of the project as a Restatement). There have been 
additional changes since then as a result of the layered, iterative drafting process. As of this writing the 
most recent version of most of the sections of the Restatement is Tentative Draft No. 1 (Am. Law Inst., 
Apr. 2016), with additional sections and some revisions reflected in Council Draft No. 3 (Am. Law Inst., 
Dec. 2016). 
 16 See Jay M. Feinman, The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance as a Restatement: An 
Introduction to the Issue, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 17 Priest, supra note 7, at 636. 
 18 Id. at 636 n.8. 
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citations to court decisions in specific jurisdictions that run counter to the 
particular rules that have been proposed? Perhaps the most striking charac-
teristic of Priest’s essay, which again critiques a document that is primarily 
about the common law, is the complete lack of citations to any judicial deci-
sions.  
The Restatement of course has many citations. Hundreds of them. In-
deed, for every rule that is articulated, in addition to comments explaining 
the rule’s application, the reporters’ notes provide citations to judicial deci-
sions in jurisdictions that have adopted the rule.19 In addition, where we ad-
dress some of the specific Restatement sections that Priest singles out for 
criticism, we cite some of the relevant case law that bears on those issues, 
which we of course borrow from the Restatement itself. 
A more precise, and less overblown, version of Priest’s complaint might 
be that, while the Restatement’s rules are generally grounded in the common 
law, they do not frequently enough reflect the “majority view,” by which is 
usually meant the rule that a majority of states that have addressed the ques-
tion have followed. We have two general responses to this more modest con-
cern.  
First, the concept of what constitutes a majority rule in the context of 
state-based common law is often disputed.20 Is it defined by the ratio of juris-
dictions that have adopted the rule to the total number of jurisdictions? Or 
should the ratio be adjusted so that the jurisdictions with larger populations 
receive greater weight, as in the federal electoral process? Presumably deci-
sions of the highest court in a state count more than the decisions of lower 
courts within that state, but how much more? And what about decisions of 
federal courts interpreting the state law? Also, what if a question of insurance 
law has been addressed by only a handful of courts? If three out of the only 
four states that have addressed a question reached result A, does that mean 
result A is “the majority rule,” even though 47 jurisdictions have not yet had 
an occasion to address the issue? What if the trend of recent decisions con-
flicts with older decisions? What if courts commonly recite a standard that 
has one meaning in common parlance but the courts routinely give that stand-
ard a different meaning, so much so that commentators generally remark 
upon it? That none of these questions have simple answers suggests that, in 
the process of drafting a Restatement of a given area of law, the drafters 
should not give the concept of the majority rule more weight than it is due. 
Second, the American Law Institute does not, nor has it ever, required 
that Restatements adopt only rules that have been followed by a majority of 
  
 19 See generally RLLI (every section is followed by a reporters’ note citing case law). 
 20 We know this because we have received comments—from both insurance company and policy-
holder lawyers at different times—using different definitions of the “majority rule” to support their argu-
ments concerning which rule the ALI ought to adopt. 
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states. Consider the following description of a Restatement from the ALI 
Council’s Revised Style Manual: 
A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to 
and respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate or in-
consistent with the law as a whole. Faced with such precedent, an Institute Reporter 
is not compelled to adhere to what Herbert Wechsler called “a prepondering balance 
of authority” but is instead expected to propose the better rule and provide the ra-
tionale for choosing it. A significant contribution of the Restatements has also been 
anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending and expression of that de-
velopment in a manner consistent with previously established principles.21 
According to the ALI Council, while a Restatement should take into account 
what the majority rule is on a particular issue (insofar as that can be deter-
mined), it should also take into account the direction of or trends in the law 
as well as the desirability of alternative rules.22 When diverging from a clear 
majority rule, Restatements should openly acknowledge that fact and explain 
why, which is what the Restatement of Liability Insurance Law does in those 
few instances in which it does not follow a majority rule (and in most of those 
instances there is in fact no majority rule in the strong definition of that 
term).23  
II. RESPONDING TO PRIEST’S ARGUMENT THAT THE RESTATEMENT HAS A 
PRO-POLICYHOLDER BIAS THAT WILL DISRUPT INSURANCE MARKETS 
Priest’s essay argues that there are two flaws in our understanding of 
how insurance works, which lead to a “pro-policyholder” bias in the Restate-
ment that is socially undesirable.24 First, he claims that we proceed from the 
false assumption that most insurance policyholders do not actually read their 
policies and so are unaware of all the terms to which they are agreeing.25 
  
 21 AM. L. INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR 
ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 5 (rev. ed. 2015), https://www.ali.org 
/publications/style-manual/. 
 22 Id.  
 23 See, e.g., RLLI § 21, reporters’ note to cmt. a (noting that some commentators have characterized 
the default rule in favor of recoupment of defense costs as the majority rule); RLLI § 25 cmt. e (“While 
perhaps not yet the majority rule, an increasingly large number of states permit the insured to settle without 
the consent of the insurer under the conditions stated in subsection (3).”); RLLI § 27, reporters’ note to 
cmt. d (providing a detailed, exhaustive description of the case law related to the inclusion of an underly-
ing punitive damages award as consequential damages for breach of the duty to make reasonable settle-
ment decisions); RLLI § 37, cmt. g (noting that “[a]mong the few published opinions to address this 
situation, the majority strictly enforce the claim-reporting condition”). 
 24 Priest, supra note 7, at 636. We unpack what Priest means by “pro-policyholder” below. 
 25 See, e.g., id. at 651 (“The drafters of the proposed Restatement make much of their assertion that 
consumers do not read the terms of their insurance contracts before entering into them . . . .”). 
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Second, he claims that we are under the erroneous belief that the central func-
tion of private insurance arrangements is to engage in redistribution from 
those who have not suffered losses to those who have, irrespective of what 
the insurance contract says.26 These two flaws, he argues, have led us to pro-
pose a series of rules that will ultimately lead to a reduction in the availability 
of liability insurance, thereby harming policyholders.27  
As to the claim that we are under the impression that most policyholders 
do not read their insurance policies, he is right. We are indeed under that 
impression. It is certainly true with respect to most consumers and small-
business policyholders, and, in our experience, even many larger corporate 
policyholders. Moreover, those policyholders who do try to read their poli-
cies, especially but not only the consumer policyholders, do not understand 
much of what they are reading.28 In the process of getting the policyholder to 
purchase an insurance policy, the agent of the insurer will usually disclose to 
the policyholder the policy limits, the amount of the deductible, and (cer-
tainly) the amount of the premium. The agent may even mention a few spe-
cial features of the coverage that he believes will make the policy seem ap-
pealing to the potential policyholder. But that information is only a tiny por-
tion of what a policyholder would need to know to fully understand the terms 
of the insurance policy, which are often more than twenty pages of single-
spaced fine print. Those few known terms are almost never the subject of the 
insurance coverage litigation that is covered by the rules in the Restatement.29  
Moreover, the vast majority of insurance companies—possibly all of 
them—provide the policyholder (consumers and even large businesses) with 
  
 26 Id. at 636 (“[T]he Reporters’ central understanding of insurance is that it serves simply to redis-
tribute risks from person who have suffered a loss to persons who have not.”). 
 27 Id. at 661 (stating that the Restatement, “if adopted, will reduce insurance availability generally 
and, especially, for the low income in the society.”). 
 28 It is common knowledge that the vast majority of people do not read and do not understand the 
standard form contracts that they sign, including insurance contracts, and that, when they do read them, 
they do not understand the terms of those contracts. See, e.g., John Aloysius Cogan, Jr., Readability, Con-
tracts of Recurring Use, and the Problem of Ex Post Judicial Governance of Health Insurance Policies, 
94 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93, 102-03 (2010) (“One of the defining characteristics of contracts of 
adhesion, and insurance contracts in particular, is that they are unreadable. There appears to be total con-
sensus on this point. Law professors, treatises, commentators and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
all concede that people do not read their insurance contracts due in large part to the complexity of the 
contracts.” (citations omitted)). See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” 
in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009) (commenting on the widespread “unreadness” of stand-
ard form contracts). For a recent summary of the academic literature on why people have difficulty un-
derstanding standard form contracts of all sorts and why they are therefore not inclined to read them, see 
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 79–93 (2014) (documenting the problems of illiteracy, innumeracy, and “sector 
illiteracy”). 
 29 Priest regards the fact that policyholders know their policy limits and deductibles as evidence that 
they read their policies and understand what is in them. Priest, supra note 7, at 651. We are unpersuaded.  
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an actual copy of their policy only after the policyholder has agreed to pur-
chase the coverage and has paid at least the initial premium.30 By that time, 
very few consumers will have the inclination or the energy even to look at 
their policies. Further, most of the ones who do read their policies will lack 
the concentration (as well as the literacy and numeracy) necessary to read 
and understand the whole thing.31 Nor is it worth their while to do so. Many 
of the provisions in the policy will be incomprehensible without the assis-
tance of lawyer, an insurance agent, or a broker. Moreover, even if the poli-
cyholder struggles through the many pages of fine print, obscure jargon, and 
seemingly simple words that have been given highly specialized meanings, 
and they are able to understand all aspects of their insurance policy, what 
would be the point? Insurance contracts are standard forms; it’s not as if the 
terms are negotiable. For all of these reasons, it is unreasonable to expect a 
typical policyholder to read her policy.32  
What is the significance of all this? What follows from the Reporters’ 
belief and the Restatement’s acknowledgment that policyholders tend not to 
read (and not to understand) their insurance policies? Not as much as Priest 
implies. As it turns out, our belief that insurance purchasers often do not (and 
reasonably do not) read their insurance policies does not serve as the justifi-
cation for any rule in the Restatement, save one (estoppel, which we address 
in detail below). To the contrary, the Restatement, in the vast  majority of 
cases, holds policyholders to the terms of the insurance agreement whether 
or not they read it. Thus, if the only reasonable interpretation of the policy 
provides that there is no coverage for a given loss, there is no coverage for 
that loss. Whether the policyholder has read the insurance policy in such a 
case does not matter. This is true even if the policyholder reasonably believes 
that the loss is covered.33  
Priest’s second claim is that we do not believe that liability insurance 
policies are part of a private market for contractually provided insurance cov-
erage. Rather, he attributes to us the view that insurance serves “to redistrib-
ute risks from persons who have suffered a loss to persons who have not.”34 
In his opinion, we see insurance as “basically a redistributional instrument”35 
  
 30 See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 
1266 (2011) (“Despite massive marketing campaigns by insurers emphasizing the importance of coverage 
in addition to premiums, it is currently virtually impossible for ordinary consumers to compare the scope 
of coverage that different carriers provide. Insurers do not make their policy language available to con-
sumers until after they purchase coverage. . . . And preliminary evidence suggests that many insurance 
agents are both unaware of potential differences in coverage among carriers and unfamiliar with many 
details of coverage they sell.”). 
 31 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, at 79–93. 
 32 Again, many others have said this before us. See generally sources cited at note 28, supra. 
 33 This last statement reflects the fact that the Restatement does not adopt the strongest form of the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations. See RLLI § 4, cmt. b. 
 34 Priest, supra note 7, at 636. 
 35 Id. at 639. 
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and simply do not understand that “not all risks can be insured.”36 The “fact” 
that we hold this view is another reason why the Restatement is supposedly 
stacked with pro-policyholder rules: the reporters of the Restatement want to 
redistribute from the haves to the have-nots.37 
To support the case that the Restatement includes a bunch of redistrib-
utive rules, Priest spends several pages, in a long section of his paper entitled 
“How Liability Insurance Operates,” explaining the basics of insurance eco-
nomics.38 He notes, for example, that a private insurance market aggregates 
risks (i.e., it groups together similar but uncorrelated risks, thereby using the 
law of large numbers to reduce variance), segregates risks (i.e., classifying 
insureds into risk pools according to their expected losses to combat adverse 
selection), and seeks to combat moral hazard (through deductibles and co-
payments).39 By contrast, Priest seems to be arguing, a system of pure redis-
tribution does not do any of those things. The impression Priest is going for 
in this part is that the Restatement’s rules are less characteristic of what one 
would expect to find in a private insurance market and more characteristic of 
what one would expect to find in a social insurance program along the lines 
of Medicare or the Affordable Care Act.40 
Taken on its face, the argument is silly. There is obviously nothing in 
the Restatement that suggests all risks can or must be insured. As already 
discussed, under the rules in the Restatement, if a liability insurance contract 
excludes a particular loss, that loss is not covered by that policy.41 Also under 
the rules in the Restatement, if the policyholder fails to satisfy one of the 
policy’s conditions, there is no coverage, subject in some cases to a require-
ment that the insurer demonstrate prejudice.42 As the Restatement repeatedly 
makes clear, the common law of insurance has its source in contract law; and, 
accordingly, it is the insurance policy that determines the outcome.43 
There is also nothing in Priest’s description of the economics of private 
insurance markets that is inconsistent with the rules in the Restatement. In-
deed, the rules of insurance law articulated in the Restatement are fundamen-
tal to the economics of insurance, as described by Priest. More specifically, 
there can be no risk aggregation through private insurance without rules of 
  
 36 Id. at 637. 
 37 It is not clear whether he thinks we are trying to redistribute to the liability insurance policyhold-
ers who suffer losses or to the tort victims who have suffered losses and are suing those policyholders as 
defendants. Either way, he regards such redistribution as counterproductive, for the reasons described 
below. 
 38 Priest, supra note 7, at 637–51. 
 39 Id. at 640–50. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See RLLI §§ 2–4 (addressing insurance policy interpretation). 
 42 RLLI § 35, cmt. b, c (addressing conditions in insurance policies). 
 43 Examples include the sections addressing interpretation, RLLI, §§ 2–4, and sections stating de-
fault rules that can be altered by contrary language in the insurance policy.  See, e.g., RLLI §§ 10, 20, 21, 
23, 33, 42. 
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insurance policy interpretation.44 There can be no risk segregation, and no 
combatting of adverse selection, without the doctrine of misrepresentation.45 
As Priest notes, insurers attempt to reduce the possibility of moral hazard 
through exclusions, coinsurance, and deductibles.46 As Priest fails to note, 
however, all those categories of insurance policy terms are addressed in spe-
cific sections of the Restatement.47 Moreover, just to be clear, there is almost 
no resemblance between the vision of insurance embodied in the contract-
based Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance and the social welfare vi-
sion of insurance embodied in the clearly and intentionally redistributive pro-
grams of Medicare or the Affordable Care Act.48  
A more precise and more modest version of Priest’s redistribution cri-
tique might be this: When justifying one insurance law rule over another, the 
Restatement sometimes takes into consideration which rule is more likely to 
result in compensation for the injured victims who are bringing a claim 
against the policyholder. That statement would be true, though the number 
of times the Restatement does so is far fewer than Priest’s essay suggests, 
and that consideration is not dispositive in any of those instances.49 In our 
view, and as the Restatement reflects, liability insurance serves multiple 
functions. It primarily provides insurance coverage for liability policyholders 
against the risk of a lawsuit.50 But it also works with liability law itself to 
create incentives for policyholders to take reasonable care to minimize 
risks.51 And it helps to ensure that victims of legitimate tort claims have the 
  
 44 See e.g., RLLI § 2, cmt. d (explaining how consistent interpretation of insurance policy terms 
“facilitates the orderly operation of the insurance market”). 
 45 See, e.g., RLLI § 7, cmt. a.  
 46 Priest, supra note 7, at 640. 
 47 See, e.g., RLLI Ch. 3, Topic 3, Application of Limits, Retentions, and Deductibles. It’s also mys-
tifying why Priest would try to create the impression that the Reporters—or anyone working in this area—
would not be aware of such basic concepts as risk segregation, risk aggregation, and moral hazard. Again, 
this is the stuff of high school or perhaps college microeconomics. 
 48 For just one example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act expressly forbids the sort 
of risk segregation that the Restatement’s misrepresentation rules assume. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) 
(2012). See generally Tom Baker, Health Insurance Risk and Responsibility after the Affordable Care 
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2011) (“The Affordable Care Act embodies a new social contract of 
health care solidarity through . . . markets, choice and individual responsibility, with government as the 
insurer for the elderly and poor.”). On competing conceptions of insurance, see generally Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013). 
 49 The complete list: RLLI § 2 cmt. e, § 9 cmt. f, § 26 cmt. a and § 37 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
April 2016) and § 47 cmts. f-h (Council Draft No. 3 December 2016) Note that the § 37 in TD No. 1 
became § 36 in the December 2016 draft. 
 50 RLLI § 1 (defining “liability insurance”).  
 51 See generally Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Review, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 169–98 (Jennifer Arlen, 
ed. 2013); Omri Ben Shahar & Kyle Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral 
Hazard, 111 U. MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). 
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opportunity to bring their claims and receive compensation that they are 
owed.52  
III. THE RESTATEMENT’S SO-CALLED “PRO-POLICYHOLDER” RULES  
Priest repeatedly implies that the Restatement is chockfull of what he 
calls “pro-policyholder” rules, a fact that he contends will ultimately lead to 
bad consequences for policyholders because of the effects on the price and 
availability of coverage.53 Priest does not define the term “pro-policyholder,” 
but he seems to mean this: As between two possible rules of insurance law 
that a court could choose to apply to a given issue before it, the rule that is 
more likely to result in a judgment for the policyholder is the pro-policy-
holder rule. The other rule, the one more likely to result in a judgment for the 
insurer, might be called the pro-insurer rule, though Priest does not use that 
term. Focusing on remedies, a relatively pro-policyholder rule regarding, say, 
damages would be one that, on average, tended to produce larger damage 
awards for policyholders in coverage disputes than some alternative pro-in-
surer damage rule. 
Before we get into the question of which particular rules in the Restate-
ment are pro-policyholder, relatively speaking, we should acknowledge the 
obvious: whether a rule is pro-policyholder or pro-insurer in the narrow ex 
post sense described above reveals nothing about whether the rule is socially 
desirable or not.54 To know whether a pro-policyholder or pro-insurer rule is 
socially desirable, we need to know—or have an educated guess about—the 
consequences of the rule.55 For example, a pro-policyholder rule of insurance 
law would be socially desirable, all else equal, if it allocated to the insurer a 
risk that the insurer was in the best position to reduce or eliminate. In that 
situation, the pro-policyholder rule would reduce social costs (i.e., the total 
costs of insurance plus private precaution), and perhaps even reduce the price 
of insurance. In that case, calling the rule simply “pro-policyholder” would 
be myopic. Yes, the rule is “pro-policyholder” in that it would be more likely 
to lead to a policyholder victory in litigation over coverage, but it would also 
be “pro-insurer” by improving the functioning of liability insurance markets. 
Perhaps the most obvious example of such a pro-policyholder rule is the 
doctrine of contra proferentem (CP): the rule that ambiguities in contracts 
  
 52 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 1. See also David A. Fischer & Robert H. Jerry, II, Teaching 
Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857 (2001).  
 53 Priest, supra note 7, at 636, 658 (discussing pro-policyholder bias of Restatement generally and 
negative consequences if adopted, including reduction in availability of coverage). 
 54 From now on, when we use the term pro-policyholder and pro-insurer, we mean them in the 
narrow ex post sense.  
 55 We might also be concerned with non-consequentialist questions, such as which rule is more 
consistent with some conception of justice.  
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are construed against the party who drafted the ambiguous language.56 Be-
cause insurance policies are typically standard form contracts that are drafted 
by insurance companies, the CP rule generally works to the advantage of 
policyholders in coverage litigation against insurers. Specifically, when an 
insurer seeks to deny coverage (or to decline to provide a defense) on the 
basis of its interpretation of a particular term in the contract, if there is a rea-
sonable interpretation of that term that favors coverage, the policyholder will 
generally prevail.57 In a sense, the CP rule in the insurance context places the 
risk of an ambiguous policy term on the insurer rather than the policyholder.58 
Because the insurer—being the drafter of the policy term—is in the better 
position to reduce the risk of contract-term ambiguity, the allocation of that 
risk to the insurer-drafter via the CP rule is typically thought to be socially 
desirable. After all, CP is and has long been the prevailing rule in every U.S. 
jurisdiction.59  
Not only does CP have the effect of minimizing the risk of ambiguity. 
It also allocates efficiently and fairly the risk of ambiguity that cannot be 
eliminated. It is not possible to write an insurance policy that contains no risk 
of ambiguity. While a well-drafted contract term may seem clear when ap-
plied to one context, that same term, when applied to a new setting not fully 
anticipated by the drafter, may take on additional meanings. Under the CP 
rule, that risk of irreducible ambiguity is allocated to the insurer-drafter of 
the policy.60 Does this allocation of such risk make sense? It does. Although 
such an allocation might result in somewhat higher premiums being charged 
to policyholders than would be charged under some alternative rule (though 
this would have to be proven, and not simply assumed),61 the additional pre-
mium is more than offset by the additional “ambiguity insurance” that is im-
plicitly provided with every policy.62  
  
 56 RLLI § 4 (addressing the interpretation of ambiguous policy terms). 
 57 The rule as applied is slightly more nuanced. If there are two reasonable meanings of a term, 
courts will typically consider extrinsic evidence to determine if a single meaning can be isolated. RLLI, 
§ 4(2) (“When an insurance policy term is ambiguous, the term is interpreted in favor of the part that did 
not supply the term, unless the other party persuades the court that this interpretation is unreasonable in 
light of extrinsic evidence.”). Put differently, the extrinsic evidence is used to determine if one of the 
otherwise plausible readings of the language of the term is, considering all the evidence, not in fact rea-
sonable. If after this analysis, there remain two reasonable meanings, then the ambiguity is construed 
against the insurer. Id. 
 58 RLLI § 4, cmt. i (regarding the “residual risk of unavoidable ambiguity”).  
 59 RLLI § 4, reporters’ note to cmt. h.  
 60 This is true because the CP rule is generally understood as a rule of strict liability against the 
drafter. An alternative version of the CP rule would be one that construed ambiguous terms against the 
drafter only if the ambiguity could not reasonably be eliminated. That is not the rule in most jurisdictions, 
and it is not the rule adopted in the Restatement. If such a negligence-based rule of CP were adopted, it 
would mean that the risk of irreducible ambiguity would typically be borne by the policyholder. 
 61 Say, under a negligence-based CP rule or under a rule that did not apply at all. 
 62 While definitive empirical proof of this last point requires evidence that only the insurance in-
dustry has, it is certainly a reasonable presumption in this context, given that policyholders have a clearly 
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In sum, there is every reason to believe that the doctrine of contra 
proferentem, a clearly pro-policyholder rule of insurance law, is socially de-
sirable. A similar analysis can be applied to any Restatement rule that is 
thought to be pro-policyholder in the narrow, ex post sense. Consider, for 
example, the Restatement’s rule on estoppel, which can be understood as al-
locating the risk of a misleading statement or action by an agent of the insur-
ance company. Under the rule of estoppel in insurance law, if an insurer 
through its agent makes a representation that a particular type of claim is 
covered, and the policyholder reasonably relies on this representation to her 
detriment (by neglecting to look elsewhere for coverage or by engaging in 
some activity under the belief that she is covered), the insurer is estopped 
from later denying that representation.63 This is so even if there happens to 
be language in the policy that directly contradicts the agent’s misleading rep-
resentation, again assuming the policyholder’s reliance was reasonable.  
If we assume that it is unreasonable to expect most policyholders to read 
and understand their policies, then clearly the party in the best position to 
reduce the risk of a misleading statement by an agent of the insurer is the 
insurer. The insurer can devote resources to hiring competent people to be 
agents, training them how to do their jobs, monitoring their performance, and 
disciplining them when they say or do things to mislead policyholders. Even 
though the insurer cannot eliminate the risk of the agents engaging in mis-
leading behavior (even with a first-rate hiring and training regimen), the best 
allocation of that residual risk is on the insurer. Here again, there is the resid-
ual or irreducible risk of unpreventable insurance agent misbehavior. As to 
that risk, surely a reasonable policyholder would be willing to pay a 
miniscule additional premium to cover her against the risk that, notwithstand-
ing the insurer’s best efforts, an insurance company agent might, intention-
ally or unintentionally, mislead a policyholder into detrimental reliance.  
This is the reasoning on which the Restatement’s estoppel rule is based. 
That is also the reasoning that can be used to justify almost all the pro-poli-
cyholder rules (in Priest’s ex post, myopic sense) in modern insurance law 
and, thus, in the Restatement, including the set of rules that together fall un-
der the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which are the focus of Priest’s 
critique, to which we turn next.  
  
demonstrated aversion to risk (hint: they are purchasing insurance) and given the beneficial deterrence 
effect of the CP rule discussed above, and given that the rule CP has been applied for decades in every 
jurisdiction in the country without disrupting insurance markets or undermining insurance availability. 
See generally Tom Baker, The Shifting Terrain of Risk and Uncertainty on the Liability Insurance Field, 
1 J. FIN. PERSP. 29 (2013) (using financial data filed with the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners to show that the U.S. liability insurance market has grown since the early 20th Century at roughly 
the same rate as the U.S. GDP). 
 63 RLLI § 6 (addressing the doctrine of estoppel). 
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IV. THE RESTATEMENT WILL NOT DESTABILIZE INSURANCE MARKETS: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT MISREPRESENTATION, DUTY TO DEFEND, AND 
DUTY TO SETTLE  
Priest’s primary argument is that, if courts were to adopt the (according 
to him) radical new pro-policyholder rules proposed in the Restatement, the 
result would be destabilization of liability insurance markets. In our view, 
none of the rules contained in the Restatement are either radical or new. Cer-
tainly the rules discussed above regarding contract interpretation and estop-
pel are neither radical nor new. So which Restatement rules in particular does 
Priest believe are radical and new? Again, he is somewhat mysterious on this 
point.64 The few specific rules he does mention involve the insurer’s ability 
to deny a claim and rescind a policy based on a misrepresentation by the 
policyholder, the insurer’s duty to defend, and the insurer’s duty to make 
reasonable settlement decisions. Yet, these rules—presumably the best ex-
amples he could find to prove his point—support neither the proposition that 
the Restatement rules are new nor that they would destabilize insurance mar-
kets. We address his specific arguments with respect to these doctrines next. 
A. Misrepresentation 
The first specific rule adopted in the Restatement that Priest chooses to 
critique is the rule regarding misrepresentation.65 What is most interesting 
about Priest’s critique is that, while he focuses on certain details that he re-
gards as being excessively pro-policyholder (discussed below), he down-
plays the fact that the core of the rule is exceptionally pro-insurer. In fact, 
most of his misrepresentation critique is directed at a more pro-policyholder 
version of that core rule that was in a much earlier draft, when the project 
was a Principles project, rather than the pro-insurer rule that is in the Restate-
ment.66 
In the insurance context, the doctrine of misrepresentation deals primar-
ily with false statements made by policyholders to insurers in the application 
and renewal process.67 According to the Restatement, if a policyholder makes 
a misrepresentation in filling out her application for coverage (or in the re-
newal proposes) that is material and reasonably relied upon by the insurer in 
providing coverage, the insurer can deny a claim filed under the policy and 
  
 64 Priest, supra note 7, at 636 n.8 (“This paper is meant to be conceptual and will not specifically  
address differences between the proposed rules and the law in the several jurisdictions.”). 
 65 Id. at 653–55. 
 66 We address this earlier rule and Priest’s critique of it, below.  
 67 Estoppel and waiver tend to be the doctrines used to deal with misrepresentations made by insur-
ers, or agents of insurers, to policyholders. 
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can rescind the policy.68 This is true even if the policyholder’s mistake is 
unintentional, indeed even if the mistake is not even negligent.69 In such a 
case, although the policyholder gets a refund of her premiums (since she in 
effect never had coverage), she is left without coverage for the loss in ques-
tion. This pro-insurer rule is the common-law rule in well over half of the 
U.S. states (though it is modified by statute in some states), and, for that rea-
son, it is the rule adopted by the Restatement.70 
The specific aspects of the Restatement’s misrepresentation rules that 
Priest takes issue with involve the definitions of materiality and reliance. The 
entire critique of these rules, which is representative of Priest’s more general 
critique of the Restatement generally, consists of the following three sen-
tences:  
They propose very strong standards for an insurer proof of materiality and detri-
mental reliance. These provisions simply add to the shift in responsibility from the 
insurance applicant to the insurer in determining the risk attributes of the applicant. 
Even as amended, these rules, if adopted, will have the economic effect of reducing 
insurance availability to the society by increasing the costs and reducing the predict-
ability of the underwriting process.71  
What this argument suggests is that (a) the materiality and detrimental reli-
ance standards that we adopt are new, (b) they are pro-policyholder, and (c) 
if adopted would disrupt insurance markets, which causes a reduction in in-
surance availability.  
As to the first point, Priest does not explain how the materiality standard 
adopted by the Restatement diverges from existing law. That is not terribly 
surprising, because in fact some version of this definition of materiality is 
used in every jurisdiction in the country.72 As to the second point, Priest does 
not explain why the materiality definition chosen by the Restatement is rela-
tively pro-policyholder. That too is not surprising, because in fact the defini-
tion of materiality adopted by the Restatement is distinctly pro-insurer rela-
tive to a leading alternative rule.  
This point could use additional explanation. The Restatement’s defini-
tion of materiality is straightforward: “A misrepresentation . . . is material 
only if, in the absence of the misrepresentation, a reasonable insurer in this 
insurer’s position would not have issued the policy or would have issued the 
policy only under substantially different terms.”73 In adopting this “material 
to the risk” definition of materiality, the Restatement rejects the “contribute-
  
 68 RLLI § 7. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at cmt. j.  
 71 Priest, supra note 7, at 655. 
 72 See RLLI § 8, Reporter’s Notes to cmts. a–c. 
 73 RLLI § 8. 
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to-the-loss” approach favored by a leading law and economic analysis of mis-
representation law.74 Under the “contribute-to-the-loss” materiality rule, the 
insurer can raise the misrepresentation defense only in “situations in which 
the misrepresentation by the policyholder actually materialized in (‘contrib-
uted to’) the loss that occurred and for which the insured filed a claim.”75 
There are a number of reasons that the material-to-the-risk approach was cho-
sen.76 The simple point to be made here, however, is that the contribute-to-
the-loss approach would afford insurers with a misrepresentation defense in 
far fewer cases than does the material-to-the-risk approach. Thus, the rule 
adopted by the Restatement is, by comparison, clearly the pro-insurer rule 
(again, in the narrow ex post sense).  
Finally, as to the third point above, regarding the effects of the Restate-
ment’s rules on insurance markets, the answer is clear: Inasmuch as every 
jurisdiction in the country seems to be using some version of the definition 
of materiality that the Restatement adopts—which is a relatively pro-insurer 
conception of materiality—it is very difficult to take seriously the argument 
that the adoption of this rule will lead to disruption in liability insurance mar-
kets.77  
  
 74 See generally Henrik Lando, Optimal Rules of Negligent Misrepresentation in Insurance Con-
tract Law, 46 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 70 (2016). For a discussion of the contribute to the loss rule in 
relation to materiality, see generally Kathryn H. Vratil & Stacy M. Andreas, The Misrepresentation De-
fense in Causal Relation States: A Primer, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 832 (1991). 
 75 RLLI § 9, cmt. b. 
 76 RLLI § 9, cmt. b explains these reasons as follows: 
This Section does not follow the contribute-to-the-loss approach for four reasons. First, the 
contribute-to-the-loss rule does not address the primary concern to which the doctrine of mis-
representation is a response: the problem of high-risk policyholders intentionally and dishon-
estly understating their risks in order to obtain coverage at a price that is subsidized by honest 
members of the same risk pool. Such adverse selection is unfair and inefficient (as discussed 
in Comment a to § 7) and should be discouraged even if the policyholder’s misrepresentation 
did not give rise to the loss under the policy. The contribute-to-the-loss approach would pe-
nalize only those misrepresentations that happen to contribute to the particular loss for which 
the insured files a claim. By contrast, the standard followed in this Section appropriately pe-
nalizes all misrepresentations that meet the requirements of § 7. Second, the contribute-to-the-
loss rule can be unreasonably difficult for an insurer to satisfy, because of the absence of proof 
of the precise connection between the misrepresentation in question and the cause of the loss 
for which a claim is being filed. The rule therefore results in unfair cross-subsidies, as rela-
tively high-risk policyholders who have misrepresented their risks under circumstances in 
which the causal connection is present but impossible to prove are subsidized by relatively 
low-risk policyholders who have made no such misrepresentations. Third, no court has adopted 
the contribute-to-the-loss rule as part of the common law of liability insurance. Finally, if a 
court were willing to adopt a common-law innovation to address the unfairness of the strict-
liability misrepresentation rule, the arbitrary outcomes that the contribute-to-the-loss approach 
is intended to avoid are better addressed by limiting the insurer’s misrepresentation defense to 
situations in which the policyholder acted intentionally or recklessly. 
 77 All of the same points could be made about the Restatement’s “reasonable reliance” requirement. 
Priest fails to explain precisely what it is about this rule: how precisely it diverges from existing law and 
how that divergence will lead to insurance market disruptions and lack of insurance availability. The 
reasonable reliance rule adopted by the Restatement also is a common formulation of the doctrine, used 
in many states. Knights of Pythias v. Kalinski, 163 U.S. 289, 298 (1896) (“If the company ought to have 
known of the facts, or with proper attention to its business, would have been apprised of them, it has no 
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Strangely, most of Priest’s criticisms of the misrepresentation rules—
most of the words he writes on the subject—are addressed not to explaining 
his critique of the Restatement’s materiality and reliance standards, but rather 
to developing a critique of a version of the misrepresentation rules that were 
in a prior draft, when the project was still a Principles project, but that were 
not carried over into the Restatement. We address this criticism at some 
length to make the following important point: in this and other instances, the 
Restatement adopts a rule that is much more pro-insurer (in the narrow sense) 
than an alternative for which there are good economic justifications.  
The Principles version of the misrepresentation rule worked as follows: 
If, in response to an insurer’s invocation of the misrepresentation defense, a 
policyholder could demonstrate that her misrepresentation was neither reck-
less nor intentional, then the insurer’s remedy would be limited.78 Thus, under 
that rule (which was not adopted in the Restatement because of a lack of 
sufficient common law authority), the insurer could deny the claim only if 
the policyholder’s misrepresentation was reckless or intentional. The inno-
cent, or merely negligent, policyholder would still receive coverage, though 
at the expense of having to pay the higher premiums she should have been 
paying all along.79  
Notwithstanding Priest’s arguments to the contrary, discussed further 
below, there is a lot to be said for such a rule from an economics-of-insurance 
perspective, as is explained in the Principles draft.80 It is important that inten-
tional misrepresentation be punished, to prevent relatively high risk policy-
holders from attempting, in effect, to commit a species of fraud by understat-
ing their risk and tricking the insurer into including them in an insurance pool 
whose average risks is significantly lower than that of the dishonest policy-
holder. The harm of this extreme form of adverse selection is inefficiency 
and unfairness, as the other members of the pool are forced to cross-subsidize 
the dishonest policyholder. If the policyholder’s misrepresentation, however, 
is an honest mistake, there is less concern with grouping them into the pool 
with the people who do not make the mistake. This happens with liability 
insurance pools all the time. This sort of negligence is just the type of mistake 
that people purchase liability insurance for.81 
  
right to set up its ignorance as an excuse [in order to secure forfeiture].”); 3 NEW APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 16.08[1][c] (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed., 2012).  
 78 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 7 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 2013). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at § 7 cmt. b; § 11 & cmts. 
 81 Of course, under a misrepresentation rule that protected innocent misrepresentation, insurers 
would be given an incentive to do a more thorough up-front investigation of the truth or falsity in the 
underwriting process. They might also start sorting people into risk pools according to who is more likely 
to make innocent mistakes on their insurance applications. 
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Priest’s has an answer to this very argument. Characterizing the argu-
ment as “sophistical, not persuasion,” he responds as follows: 
It is a different matter entirely when an insured drifts into a different lane or mistakes 
the brake for the gas pedal in parking or neglects to trim trees (leading to a branch 
fall that causes loss) than where an insurance applicant “mistakes” the son’s driving 
record or the number of claims filed against previous insurers on an application sit-
ting right before. [sic]82 
True enough, there is a difference between the negligence that gives rise 
to liability risk and the negligence that produces mistakes in the insurance 
underwriting process. But the next question is why the difference is im-
portant. The difference would be important, for example, if innocent mis-
takes that policyholders tend to make on their insurance applications are eas-
ier for them to avoid than mistakes they make driving their cars or trimming 
their trees. Such a difference would help explain why policyholders might 
prefer not to purchase coverage for their negligent misrepresentations, 
whereas they would want to purchase coverage for their negligent driving 
and tree-trimming. In that scenario, it might make sense to leave policyhold-
ers responsible for their own negligence, while not doing so with respect to 
their negligent driving and tree-trimming habits. But there is no evidence to 
support this potential difference in people’s ability to avoid different kinds 
of mistakes, and no theoretical reason to expect such a difference.  
Priest does not even mention this argument, however. Instead, he anal-
ogizes filling out an insurance form with filing an individual’s tax returns: 
“Ask the IRS whether insurance is available for negligence in our tax re-
turns?”83 This analogy is useful. However, not for the reasons Priest thinks. 
The IRS does indeed rely heavily on taxpayer-provided information to do its 
job of determining how much each taxpayer owes in federal income taxes. 
Individuals and corporations file returns on which they are expected to pro-
vide truthful information. Indeed, in the tax context, it is the taxpayer who 
decides initially how much they owe in taxes. And a taxpayer’s failure to 
provide accurate information, if it results in an underpayment of taxes, has 
consequences for the taxpayer. She must pay the additional corrected amount 
of tax plus interest. Moreover, if the understatement is “substantial”84 or if it 
is “negligent,”85 the taxpayer will also owe a penalty. Presumably it is this 
penalty that Priest is referring to when he implies that the IRS will not be 
offering “insurance . . . for negligence.”86  
The problem with the argument is that the amount of the penalty is 
merely 20 percent of the amount of the understated tax.87 That is, if you owed 
  
 82 Priest, supra note 7, at 655. 
 83 Id. 
 84 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a) (2012). 
 85 Id. at § 6662(b)(1). 
 86 Priest, supra note 7, at 655.   
 87 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) (2012). 
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$20,000 in tax, but you paid only $15,000, so you underpaid by $5,000, the 
penalty would be an additional $1,000 in penalty. This is not trivial. But it is 
not comparable to the consequence of an innocently negligent misstatement 
on one’s insurance application. Say your annual liability insurance premium, 
if properly calculated to reflect your risk, would be $2,000; however, because 
you made an innocent mistake on your application, you ended up wrongly 
paying a premium of only $1,500. Now assume that, once the policy is issued, 
you then suffer $500,000 in liability losses from a tort judgement and accom-
panying defense costs. Then the insurer determines that it does not owe cov-
erage for any of these losses because of the $500 innocent misrepresentation. 
That’s a penalty of one thousand percent (!), and it is easy to see why poli-
cyholders might be willing to pay a bit extra for an insurance policy that in-
cludes insurance for the enormous consequences of such innocent mistakes. 
By contrast, even though it may be true that the IRS does not provide insur-
ance against innocent taxpayer mistakes, it also punishes them so mildly that 
insurance is hardly necessary. The same cannot be said of the risk of an in-
nocent misrepresentation by a policyholder on an insurance application. 
In sum, there is a decent argument to be made for adopting a rule of 
misrepresentation that protects innocent mistakes, although such a rule has 
some obvious costs. The more important point, from the perspective of eval-
uating Priest’s critique of the Restatement, however, is that the Restatement 
did not adopt such a version of the misrepresentation doctrine! It does not 
appear in the black letter of the Restatement, in Sections 7, 8, or 9, and it is 
not adopted in any of the Comments to those sections. Priest is aware that the 
black letter changed when the project became a Restatement. But he claims 
that, despite the change in the black letter, “[t]he Discussion Draft . . .contin-
ues to contain many passages suggesting that the insurer defense should only 
extend to misrepresentations that are intentional or reckless.”88  
We are not sure which passages in the April 2015 Discussion Draft 
Priest has in mind. But since Professor Priest had access to the language of 
the misrepresentation sections of the Restatement as they were approved by 
the Council and the ALI membership in May 2016, we will refer to that lan-
guage. It is true that Comment b to Section 9, as approved, mentions the pos-
sibility that a court might adopt the reckless/intentional limitation to the tra-
ditional misrepresentation rule.89 However, it mentions that possibility only 
as a possible alternative to adopting the pro-policyholder contribute-to-the-
loss definition of materiality. That is, the Restatement argues that, if a court 
is worried that the pro-insurer increase-the-risk definition of materiality 
adopted by the Restatement is too harsh towards policyholders, the better 
reform would be the one directed explicitly to protecting innocent policy-
holders, as discussed above, rather than the contribute-to-the-loss rule. How-
ever, neither that Comment nor any other provision in the Restatement states 
  
 88 Priest, supra note 7, at 654. 
 89 RLLI  § 9, cmt. b. 
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or even suggests that the rule adopted by the Restatement limits the misrep-
resentation defense to situations in which the policyholder recklessly or in-
tentionally misled the insurer. Therefore, why Priest devoted so many words 
to this abandoned proposal—given the hundreds of pages of the Restatement 
that were in fact adopted—is mysterious. 
B. The Duty to Defend 
Priest also applies his formulaic critique—radical new pro-policyholder 
proposals that will disrupt insurance markets—to the Restatement’s approach 
to the duty to defend. Most liability insurance policies include a term that 
obligates the insurer to provide a defense if the policyholder is sued for some-
thing that is covered under the policy.90 Thus, the insurer has a contractual 
duty to provide the policyholder with a defense. As the common law inter-
preting this duty has developed, most courts have held that the insurer’s “duty 
to defend” is somewhat broader than its “duty to indemnify.”91 What this 
means in practice is that the insurer’s duty to defend is based in the first in-
stance on the claimant’s allegations, not the true facts, and if a claimant files 
suit against the policyholder and alleges both covered and uncovered claims, 
the liability insurer must provide a defense for the whole claim.92 Priest does 
not appear to take issue with these basic ground rules, which the Restatement 
adopts.93 
In a situation involving potentially covered and potentially uncovered 
claims, the Restatement provides a process by which an insurer can assume 
the defense of a policyholder while reserving its rights to contest coverage 
later. The insurer simply issues a “reservation of rights” letter to the policy-
holder, stating the grounds on which it might later contest coverage.94 If, how-
ever, the insurer undertakes to provide a defense without issuing such a res-
ervation of rights, the insurer in effect waives its rights to contest coverage.95 
On the other hand, if the insurer breaches its duty to defend by declining to 
provide a defense when a defense is owed, then there are consequences. 
What are the consequences of breaching the duty to defend? First, under 
section 19(1), the insurer loses the right to assert any control over the de-
fense.96 Second, under section 19(2), if the insurer did not have a “reasonable 
  
 90 See RLLI, § 10, cmt. a.  
 91 RLLI  §  13, cmt. b. 
 92 RLLI §§ 13(1), 14(1). Insurance law permits the insurer to avoid paying a judgment or settlement 
on the basis of the true facts (as opposed to those alleged by the underlying tort plaintiff) and to litigate 
on the basis of the true facts in a declaratory judgment action seeking to avoid continuing to provide a 
defense. RLLI § 18(7). 
 93 See Priest, supra note 7, at 658. 
 94 RLLI § 15(4).  
 95 RLLI § 15(1). 
 96 RLLI § 19(1) 
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basis” for its refusal to provide a defense, the insurer loses its ability to invoke 
its coverage defenses to avoid payment of a judgment entered in the suit.97 It 
is the latter rule that Priest regards as excessively punitive. In fact, he says it 
is so punitive and such a departure from liability insurance law as it presently 
exists that it will—you guessed it—lead to massive premium increases and 
ultimately to disruption in the availability of insurance coverage.98  
Once again, that argument does not hold water. The rule is not a radical 
departure from existing law. And there is no evidence that the liability insur-
ance markets have failed in the jurisdictions that follow it or the even more 
pro-policyholder (in the narrow sense) alternative.  
With regard to the claim that the rule is new, we note, first, that the 
section 19(2) rule applies only if the insurer both failed to provide the defense 
that was owed and lacked a reasonable basis for its failure. 99 A classic exam-
ple would be a homeowners insurer that refused to defend a bodily injury 
negligence suit on the grounds that the policyholder intentionally caused the 
harm. The insurer would lack a reasonable basis for that refusal because it is 
settled law in every U.S. jurisdiction of which we are aware that the insurer 
must defend such a suit. This rule is well within the norm of what courts do 
when an insurer refuses to defend without a reasonable basis. Many courts 
regard such a refusal to defend as a “bad faith” breach of the liability insur-
ance contract, and one of the consequences of a bad faith breach is loss of 
coverage defenses.100 Section 19(2) simply adopts that rule in the duty to de-
fend context, without the emotive overtones of the “bad faith” label. That 
approach permits the Restatement to reserve the “bad faith” label for circum-
stances in which the insurer’s culpability extends beyond negligence.101  
  
 97 RLLI § 19(2) 
 98 Priest, supra note 7, at 656–57. 
 99 To be fair, when Priest first drafted his critique of the Restatement (back when it was a Principles 
project), the rule that we proposed did not have the lack-of-reasonable-basis requirement. It is possible 
(but very disturbing given the tenor of his attack on the Restatement) that Priest simply did not notice our 
addition of this element when the project changed to a Restatement.  
 100 The noted California jurist, Walter Croskey explained this point in the context of California law, 
which refers to the lack of a reasonable basis test as the “genuine dispute doctrine,” as follows:  
[W]hile there are no cases applying the genuine dispute doctrine in duty to defend cases, the 
application of general principles does permit some reasonable conclusions. First, if a potential 
for coverage exists (i.e., there is a factual dispute over coverage) then the insurer has a duty to 
defend and its failure to do so, whatever its reason, will result in bad faith liability. Or, to put 
it another way, the failure or refusal to provide a defense when a potential for coverage exists 
constitutes bad faith as a matter of law. . . .  
Walter Croskey, Genuine Dispute Doctrine in Third Party Bad Faith Cases, 23 CAL. LITIG. 10 (2010). 
For cases supporting the loss of coverage defenses as a consequence of a bad-faith refusal to defend, see, 
e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Vanport Homes, 58 P.3d 276, 284 (Wash. 2002) (insurer forfeits coverage defense 
because of bad-faith breach of the duty to defend); Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 
875 P.2d 894, 912 (Haw. 1994) (loss of coverage defenses would be appropriate in the case of a bad-faith 
breach of the duty to defend).  
 101 RLLI § 51 (adopting a more demanding, two prong test for liability insurance bad faith) (Council 
Draft No. 3, December 2016). 
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Second, a significant number of jurisdictions provide a remedy for an 
insurer’s breach of the duty to defend that is even stronger (and thus, in 
Priest’s sense, more pro-policyholder) than the Restatement rule.102 In those 
jurisdictions, an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend always leads to the 
forfeiture of coverage defenses.103 The forfeiture is automatic; the policy-
holder does not have to show a lack of reasonable basis on the part of the 
insurer. Relative to those jurisdictions, the rule adopted in the Restatement 
is, again, relatively pro-insurer.  
With regard to the claim that the Restatement rule will destabilize in-
surance markets, our response is: Where is the evidence? In those jurisdic-
tions just mentioned, where the automatic forfeiture rule applies, there is no 
evidence of disruption in coverage or premium instability.  
This may be because the automatic forfeiture rule functions as a com-
mitment device that encourages insurers to make the right choice in circum-
stances in which they might be tempted to refuse to defend a case that they 
should defend. Indeed, if we think that insurers cannot credibly promise to 
always doing the right thing from the perspective of the policyholder once 
they are actually faced with a claim and their incentives to breach are sub-
stantial, then this rule could function as a commitment device that would in-
crease the credibility of that promise and, hence, the value of insurance to the 
policyholder and therefore increase the purchase of insurance.104 Testing this 
is, of course, an empirical question. But, assuming some myopia on the part 
of insurance claims departments, the automatic forfeiture could well be effi-
cient. Thus, as with misrepresentation, there is a good economic argument in 
favor of a rule that is more pro-policyholder, or less pro-insurer, than the rule 
the Restatement adopts.105 
  
 102 Indeed, this more punitive, more pro-policyholder rule, which is in fact the rule in a substantial 
number of jurisdictions, was included in the Principles version of this project but was rejected for the 
more pro-insurer rule currently found in RLLI § 19(2). 
 103 See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Madison, 309 F.3d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Mississippi law); Valley Improvement Ass’n v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Corp., 129 F.3d 1108, 1125–26 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (applying New Mexico law); Missionaries of Co. of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 
A.2d 21, 26 (Conn. 1967), abrogated in part, Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 67 A.3d 
961 (Conn. 2013); Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134–35 (Ill. 
1999); Farmers Union Mut. Ins. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 387 (Mont. 2004); Ames v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 340 
S.E.2d 479, 485 (N.C. App. Ct. 1986); Conanicut Marine Servs., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 511 A.2d 967, 
971 (R.I. 1986); Prof’l Office Bldgs., Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 427 N.W.2d 427, 431 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1988).   
 104 Thank you to Paul Heaton for bringing the commitment justification to our attention. See gener-
ally Gharad Bryan, et al., Commitment Devices, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 671 (2010).  
 105 Indeed, some policyholder representatives have complained that the lack-of-reasonable-basis re-
quirement will make it difficult for policyholders ever to get the forfeiture remedy. On this view, well 
advised insurers will always be able to come up with a reasonable basis after the fact. We disagree. Courts 
are regularly asked to make ex post reasonableness determinations in many contexts. This context should 
be no more difficult for them than others. 
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Priest also objects to two other rules relating to the duty to defend, as-
serting that they are “equally punitive” as the rule in 19(2): the rule relating 
to the insurer’s recoupment of defense costs paid in circumstances when it is 
later determined that the insurer did not have a duty to defend; and the rule 
regarding insurers’ duty to defend in circumstances in which a policyholder 
is covered by multiple liability insurance policies.106 Regarding recoupment, 
the Restatement rule is that the insurer’s right to recoupment is governed by 
contract law rules.107 If the insurance policy contains a provision permitting 
recoupment, or if the parties otherwise agree that the insurer may seek re-
coupment, the insurer may do so; otherwise the insurer may not.108 Regarding 
defense obligations when there are multiple insurance policies in play, the 
Restatement rule is that the policyholder may request a defense from any of 
the insurers that issued the policies in play, and the insurers may then work 
out among themselves how to manage the payment of the costs of the de-
fense.109  
What is most interesting about Priest’s objections to these two rules is 
their internal inconsistency. Regarding the recoupment rule, Priest would like 
to use a general principle of the law of restitution and unjust enrichment ra-
ther than the insurance policy language.110 But in the multiple insurer situa-
tion, Priest appears to prefer strict construction of the insurance policy lan-
guage whenever possible, obligating the policyholder to figure out how the 
multiple policies fit together.111  
One of Priest’s criticisms of the Restatement’s non-recoupment default 
rule is almost as interesting as this analytical inconsistency. He accuses us of 
offering a “sophistical explanation” for the rule, namely that “the current 
practice is not to seek recoupment, so non-recoupment must be efficient.”112 
Although that is not the primary explanation for the rule in the Restatement, 
it is one of the explanations.113 And we stand by it, because there is good 
  
 106 Priest, supra note 7, at 657. 
 107 RLLI  §  21, cmt. a. 
 108 Id. 
 109 RLLI § 20. 
 110 Priest, supra note 7, at 659–60. Priest fails to mention that there is an even more general rule of 
restitution and unjust enrichment that disfavors the use of unjust enrichment when the parties are in a 
position to address the issue by contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT, § 2, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
 111 See Priest, supra note 7, at 657–58. Priest inaccurately describes the multiple insurer rule ap-
proved in May 2016. As described in RLLI §20, cmt. a: 
The rules stated in this Section provide a practical approach to the “other insurance” problem 
that (a) gives effect to the order of priority of defense obligations when it is possible to do so, 
(b) provides a clear rule that governs when it is not possible to determine all or part of the order 
of priority, (c) protects insureds from having to hire an insurance-coverage expert to determine 
which insurer to ask for a defense, and (d) provides a mechanism for an insurer that provides 
the defense to obtain contribution or indemnification from others. 
 112 Priest, supra note 7, at 660. 
 113 Other explanations include the following: 
• The non-recoupment default rule is the emerging majority rule. 
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reason to believe that, on the whole, insurers (who, again, generally tend to 
opt not to seek recoupment) are both well informed and rational, and we can-
not think of any reason why insurers would be making myopic decisions in 
this context. Thus, per standard economic reasoning, the insurers are making 
efficient choices. Priest’s criticism is so interesting because, elsewhere in the 
essay, he applies this same economic reasoning to consumers, despite the 
strong evidence that they are not well informed and often make irrational 
insurance choices.114 Thus, Priest apparently wants us to assume that the peo-
ple making efficient liability insurance decisions are not the people who work 
full time for insurance companies but rather the people who spend a handful 
of afternoons over the course of their lives buying insurance policies. 
For a complete explanation of the reasoning behind these two Restate-
ment rules we refer readers to the Restatement. It suffices to say here that 
both rules are mainstream. The Restatement’s recoupment rule is the emerg-
ing majority rule, meaning that it has been adopted by most of the courts that 
have considered the question in recent years.115 The Restatement’s multiple 
insurer rule has long been the prevailing rule, based on the principle that a 
policyholder who is covered by multiple policies should not be worse off 
than she would be if she were covered by only one of them.116 
For all these reasons, the rules adopted by the Restatement regarding the 
liability insurer’s duty to defend are neither radical nor likely to undermine 
the availability of liability insurance. Some of the rules are, in Priest’s narrow 
  
• Because insurers could contract for recoupment at very low cost (simply by inserting a 
recoupment term in their policies), the usual justifications for applying unjust enrichment do 
not apply.  
• Because the insurer receives substantial benefits from defending under a reservation of 
rights, there is no unjust enrichment.  
• A recoupment rule reduces insurers’ incentive to manage defense costs and potentially 
expands the scope of insurance coverage litigation. 
• A default non-recoupment rule requires an insurer that wants to seek recoupment to inform 
the policyholder (and insurance regulators approving the form) by inserting a recoupment term 
in the policy, thereby facilitating informed choice by both.  
See RLLI § 21, cmts. a & b. 
 114 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 7, at 651. 
 115 See RANDY MANILOFF & JEFFREY STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE: KEY 
ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 195 (2015) (“[L]itigation surrounding an insurer’s right to reimbursement of 
defense costs has been active for the past fifteen years, with a significant spike in the last five. In general, 
insurers have won a few more of these cases than they’ve lost. But the score is close. And the minority 
view is gaining ground.”); Angela R. Elbert & Stanley C. Nardoni, Buss Stop: A Policy Language Based 
Analysis, 13 CONN. INS. L.J. 61, 92–93 (2006). See also Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Immunex Corp., 297 P.3d 
688, 693 (Wash. 2013) (“More recently . . . courts deciding in the first instance whether insurers can 
recover defense costs have generally concluded that they cannot.”). 
 116 See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in “Other Insurance,” Multiple Insurance, 
and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1380–81 (1995) (“‘Other insurance’ clauses only affect insur-
ers’ rights among themselves; they do not affect the insured’s right to recovery under each concurrent 
policy. Inter-insurer loss allocation by way of ‘other insurance’ clauses never permits allocation of a loss 
to the insured. Payment of the insured’s claim always takes priority over the allocation of the loss between 
concurrent insurers.” (internal citations omitted)). 
792 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:767 
sense, pro-policyholder—as compared with some alternative rules. But they 
are less pro-policyholder (and more pro-insurer) in that same sense than other 
alternative rules that the Restatement rejected. All of the rules adopted by the 
Restatement with respect to the duty to defend are consistent with the com-
mon law and likely to have socially desirable consequences and, thus, to be 
beneficial for the liability insurance market.  
C. Duty to Make Reasonable Settlement Decisions 
Most liability insurance policies that give the insurer the obligation to 
provide a defense also give the insurer the discretion to settle the case, which 
means the power to decide which settlement offers (often tendentiously 
called “settlement demands” by lawyers for insurance companies) from 
plaintiffs to reject and which to accept. Invoking the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, which is said to be an implied term in every contract, courts have 
long held that liability insurers have a duty to make reasonable settlement 
decisions.117 The concern is that, in cases in which the potential liability in 
the underlying case exceeds the limits of coverage in the liability policy, the 
insurer has an incentive to gamble with the policyholder’s money: to reject 
reasonable settlement offers—which a party facing the entire liability would 
not have rejected—take the case to trial, and impose on the policyholder the 
risk of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.118 Under the Restatement’s 
rule, if an insurer does this—rejects a reasonable settlement offer and takes 
the case to trial—the risk of an excess judgment shifts from the policyholder 
to the insurer.119 This rule is consistent with the rule in many jurisdictions and 
is essentially the same as the rule adopted in those jurisdictions that follow 
Judge Keeton’s “disregard the limits” rule.120 This rule also creates efficient 
  
 117 This duty is commonly referred to in the secondary literature and by some courts as the “duty to 
settle.” Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1990) (“For [a century], courts 
have invoked a doctrine known as ‘the duty to settle’ to impose liability on insurance companies who fail 
to settle lawsuits against the people they insure.” (footnote omitted)). The Restatement “uses the term 
‘duty to make reasonable settlement decisions’ to emphasize that the insurer’s duty is not to settle every 
legal action, but rather to make reasonable decisions with respect to settlement.” RLLI § 24 cmt. a. 
 118 RLLI § 24 cmt. a. It is worth noting that Priest’s analysis of the economics of insurance ignores 
such agency/opportunism costs.  
 119 Id. As explained in the comments to § 24, the rule is somewhat more nuanced in application, 
requiring the policyholder to prove that a reasonable insurer would have accepted the offer. At least in 
theory it may be reasonable to refuse to accept a reasonable offer. See RLLI § 24 cmt. d & e (Council 
Draft No. 3, December 2016). 
 120 See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 
1136, 1160–61 (1954). See also, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (“In 
determining whether an insurer has given consideration to the interests of the insured, the test is whether 
a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the settlement offer.”). 
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settlement incentives—incentives to make decisions that maximize the joint 
well-being of policyholder and insurers.121 
Priest seems not to object to the Restatement’s settlement duty rule gen-
erally, beyond his complaint that the rule is excessively “mathematical” and 
would require the use of expert witnesses.122 But he does object to the rules 
adopted by the Restatement for calculating damages for breach of the duty to 
make reasonable settlement decisions.123 Under the rule adopted in the Re-
statement, if the policyholder proves that the insurer’s unreasonable settle-
ment decision resulted in the judgment against the policyholder in the under-
lying case (e.g., a tort case), the policyholder is entitled to the total amount 
of the underlying judgment, including any punitive damages assessed against 
the policyholder, as well as damages for any consequential harm caused to 
the policyholder—such as emotional distress or loss of business reputation.124  
Priest objects to the inclusion of punitive damages on the grounds that 
many policies exclude such coverage and many jurisdictions regard such 
coverage as being against public policy.125 He argues that the rule is essen-
tially forcing insurers to provide, and preventing the states from forbidding, 
liability insurance coverage for the worst sort of behavior, the sort of behav-
ior that qualifies for punitive damages.126 Priest also objects to the inclusion 
of emotional distress damages as potential remedies. He says, in effect, that 
emotional distress damages are never awarded in contract cases. Thus, he 
argues, the Restatement is unjustifiably treating settlement duty cases as tort 
  
 121 See, e.g., Syverud, supra note 117 at 1164 (observing that the doctrine requires that insurers in-
ternalize “all of the costs of going to trial before rejecting a settlement”). 
 122 Priest, supra note 7, at 659. The rule is mathematical in the sense that the rule regards as important 
the expected value of the underlying suit, as calculated at the time the insurer’s allegedly unreasonable 
settlement decision was made. The judge is asked to compare the expected value of likely trial count, or 
of the range of such values, with the settlement offer received. This sort of ex post evaluation of an ex 
ante determination is not different in kind from reasonableness analyses that courts are asked to do every 
day in many types of cases, including tort cases. And in many of those case, expert witnesses are asked to 
provide written or oral testimony. 
 123 Id. at 661. 
 124 RLLI § 27 cmt. b. 
 125 Priest, supra note 7, at 660–61. 
 126 Id. at 660 (“There are two serious problems with these proposals. First, most (though not all) 
insurance policies exclude coverage of punitive damages judgements . . . Second, and even more tellingly, 
many jurisdictions prohibit the insurance of punitive damages on grounds of public policy[.]” (internal 
footnotes omitted)). It may not be surprising to learn that Priest provides no support for the empirical 
claim that most insurance policies exclude coverage of punitive damages. Our impression is to the con-
trary, but we acknowledge that we have not conducted the empirical research needed to answer that ques-
tion (though we would be delighted to do so if the American Insurance Association would be willing to 
provide us access to the necessary data). Priest simply cites his 1989 Alabama Law Review article about 
the insurability of punitive damages, but that article does not provide any empirical support. Indeed, it 
suggests that our contrary impression is more likely to be correct. See id. at 660 n.101 (citing George L. 
Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1033 (1989) (“The puzzle remains . . . 
why insurers have not modified policies to exclude coverage of punitive liability despite invitations to do 
so by the courts.” (footnote omitted))). 
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rather than contract cases.127 With respect to both emotional distress damages 
and punitive damages, Priest notes: “I do not need to emphasize the radical-
ism of these views.”128 He then goes on to point out that the rules permitting 
such damages, because of their radical pro-policyholder nature, will result in 
more costs being shifted to the insurance pool, premiums rising, and, ulti-
mately, “will diminish insurance availability.”129 
These arguments have several responses. First, the mistake in Priest’s 
reasoning with respect to whether settlement duty damages should include 
punitive damages awarded in the underlying suit against the policyholder is 
apparent. The Restatement expressly does not provide that liability insurers 
must cover such punitive damages or that a state’s expressed public policy to 
the contrary will be contravened.130 Rather, the Restatement merely provides 
that, if the liability insurer’s unreasonable failure to settle the case against the 
policyholder results in punitive damages award against the policyholder in 
that case, the insurer must be held responsible.131 For example, if a reasonable 
insurer would have accepted a settlement offer in a product liability suit that 
was within the limit of the policy, an insurer that rejected that settlement offer 
would be liable for the full amount of a subsequent verdict in excess of the 
policy limits, including any punitive damages component of that excess ver-
dict. Thus, so long as the insurer makes reasonable settlement decisions, it 
will not have to pay for any punitive damages awards, unless of course the 
state jurisdiction permits coverage for punitive damages and the policy pro-
vides for that coverage (as many liability insurance policies do).  
The punitive damages awarded against the policyholder in the underly-
ing suit are a clearly foreseeable consequence of the insurer’s negligence; it 
makes complete sense that the insurer whose bad behavior caused this loss 
should be held responsible. The majority rule (in the strong sense, meaning 
more than half of the states) permits insurance for punitive damages.132 
Therefore, in most states the inclusion of a punitive damages judgment in the 
  
 127 Id. at 661. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Indeed, RLLI § 47 expressly recognizes that some states prohibit such insurance on public policy 
grounds. See RLLI § 47, cmt. i. This point was also made clear in the April 2016 Tentative Draft, which 
addressed this topic in § 34, cmt. j.  
 131 RLLI § 27, cmt. d.  
 132 See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. 
REV. 409 (2005) (discussing jurisdictions’ differing approaches to the insurability of punitive damages, 
including an appendix with a 50-state survey, and noting how underwriters and insurance brokers have 
begun to circumvent public-policy objections to insuring punitive damages by including “most favorable 
venue” language, “a kind of ‘choice-of-law’ provision that specifies, for example, that if an issue arises 
regarding punitive damages, the carrier will apply the law and public policy of an applicable state with 
the ‘most favorable’ view of insurance coverage for punitive damages.”). Id. at 438–39 n.149. Priest does 
not disclose that more than half of the states permit insurance of punitive damages and that the issue is 
undecided in many others. 
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damages for breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions 
would be non-controversial. Thus, the RLLI rule is not radical, nor is likely 
to reduce insurance availability.133 
Second, while it is true that the vast majority of judgments in contract 
cases do not include emotional distress or “pain and suffering” damages, it is 
not true that none do. One important exception, of course, is found in insur-
ance cases.134 The most famous example of such a case involved, of all things, 
a breach of the duty to settle.135 Whether those cases are characterized as tort 
cases or contract cases ultimately does not matter. The result can be justified 
using either doctrinal lens: in the right circumstances, emotional distress 
harm can be the foreseeable consequence of a contract breach, just as it can 
be the reasonably foreseeable proximate result of a tort.136 What’s more, there 
is no evidence that the liability insurance markets in California, for example, 
have been in any way negatively affected by allowing policyholders to re-
cover damages for emotional distress when insurers breach the duty to make 
reasonable settlement decisions. If insurers come forward with evidence sug-
gesting otherwise, which they will allow disinterested empirical legal studies 
  
 133 In the states with a public policy against insurance for punitive damages, only three high courts 
have had occasion to consider the question of whether such damages can be included as damages for 
breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions. While all three have ruled to the contrary of 
the Restatement rule, two of those decisions were 4-3 decisions, with strong dissents. See PPG Indus., Inc. 
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652, 661 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“Inasmuch as the insurer 
is liable to its insured for damages to compensate for all the detriment that it proximately caused by its 
tortious breach of its duty to settle the claim of the insured’s victim, and inasmuch as such detriment 
includes any sums that its insured became legally obligated to pay its victim as damages for its claim, it 
follows that the insurer is liable to the insured for damages to compensate for detriment in the form of the 
sum that its insured became legally obligated to pay its victim as punitive damages as well as compensa-
tory damages.”). As to the possible moral hazard effect of the Restatement’s rule on this point, the idea 
that the policyholder will, when deciding whether to engage in the conduct that gave rise to the underlying 
claim, be influenced by the possibility that, in the event they are sued for harm caused by this behavior, 
their insurer might engage in unreasonable settlement behavior that will then make the insurer potentially 
liable for any punitive damages that might be assesses against the policyholder, seems farfetched, to say 
the least.  
 134 See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 65 P.3d 1134, 1166 (Utah 2001) (allowing 
recovery for emotional distress damages in a liability insurance action alleging breach of the insurer’s 
settlement duties). 
 135 See Crisci v. Sec. Ins., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967). 
 136 RLLI § 27 cmt. b explains this point as follows: 
Jurisdictions differ with regard to whether the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions is 
a contract duty, a tort duty, or both. Under the rules of contract law, a promisee is entitled to 
recover for loss that was foreseeable at the time of contracting as a probable result of a breach. 
By contrast, under the rules of tort law, foreseeability generally is assessed as of the time of 
the breach. Because of the expertise of insurers in assessing risks at the time of underwriting 
and in handling legal actions, they are likely in many, if not most, cases to be aware at the time 
of contracting of the kinds of consequences that follow from a lost opportunity to settle a legal 
action. Thus, it is hardly surprising that most courts have not explicitly considered the question 
of the timing of foreseeability, as the result would be the same either way in many cases, pro-
vided that the meaning of “foreseeable” is the same for both tort and contract law.  
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scholars to examine, we are confident that the ALI would be willing to con-
sider it. 
V.  CONCLUDING WORDS ON THE RLLI AND 21ST CENTURY LIABILITY 
INSURANCE ECONOMICS 
It should be clear by now that we have many disagreements with Pro-
fessor Priest’s article. Some of its critiques are addressed to proposals that 
are not part of the current draft of the Restatement. The arguments that do 
address the current draft of the Restatement grossly misrepresent the rela-
tionship between the Restatement and prevailing insurance law. And the ar-
ticle wrongly accuses the Restatement’s Reporters of ignoring basic insur-
ance economics in the drafting of the Restatement. 
Strangely, it is actually Priest’s article that ignores basic economics, at 
least as understood in the 21st Century. Specifically, his critique proceeds 
from the assumption that pro-policyholder rules (in his narrow ex post sense 
of that term) are socially undesirable because they will raise insurance prices 
and reduce the availability of coverage. That assumption could only always 
be true if two other assumptions were also true: namely, the assumption that 
liability insurance purchasers are perfectly informed and fully rational. If 
those assumptions sound familiar, it is because they are. They are the “Chi-
cago School” assumptions that held sway when Priest helped to establish law 
and economics as a serious discipline back in the 1970s and 1980s.137 
A lot has happened in the field of law and economics since then. Neither 
empirical law and economics, nor behavioral law and economics, nor the 
fuller development of the economics of asymmetric information have been 
kind to those assumptions, especially when it comes to insurance. The evi-
dence against fully informed and perfectly rational insurance purchasers—
especially but not only for consumers buying insurance—is overwhelming.138 
So much so that the few remaining defenders of the faith are left with argu-
  
 137 See, e.g., Priest, supra notes 3–6. Cf. Mark Geistfeld, Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing 
Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1061 n.18 (1988) (“One commentator has 
concluded that judicial expansion of manufacturer products liability in tort leads to a less optimal provi-
sion of product safety. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 
1349 (1981). But Professor Priest assumes perfect information about product risks, id. at 1307, and thus 
implicitly assumes that manufacturers supply optimal product safety independent of liability rules.”). For 
a more recent criticism of Professor Priest’s work, see Alvin E. Roth, Marketplace Institutions Related to 
the Timing of Transactions: Reply to Priest (2010), 30 J. LABOR ECON. 479 (2012) (“In this reply I will 
argue that Priest’s theoretical model lends no support to his position, and that the empirical claims he 
makes are simply false.”). 
 138 See generally e.g., HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER, ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY (2013). 
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ments about the ability of some well informed and reasonably rational con-
sumers to make the market work for everyone.139 But recent theoretical and 
empirical work—specifically in the field of insurance—has demonstrated the 
falsity of even that more modest claim.140 Indeed, as taught in graduate level 
economics courses today, insurance economics proceeds from a baseline un-
derstanding that there are significant market failures, especially in consumer 
insurance markets.141 
Today, no serious economic analysis of liability insurance rules would 
ever proceed from the assumption that, when comparing two possible rules, 
the one that is more friendly to policyholders in the litigation context will 
necessarily be more socially costly and therefore reduce the availability of 
liability insurance. That is something to be investigated, not assumed. If there 
are market failures—for example, consumers who are less than fully in-
formed about the terms of the policy, consumers who misestimate the likeli-
hood or extent of their potential liabilities, insurers with market power, un-
faithful insurance intermediaries—it could easily be the case that adopting 
the policyholder friendly rule could increase the availability of insurance. To 
know whether this would in fact be the case for any choice of rules takes 
work: good evidence or a compelling theory built on realistic assumptions. 
The difficulty of that work is one reason why the Restatement of Lia-
bility Insurance Law does not rest primarily on liability insurance economics. 
Instead, as any Restatement must, it rests primarily on careful, exhaustive 
analysis of legal authority and on the high quality analytical skills that the 
American Law Institute brings to bear on any topic worthy of its attention. 
Yes, Reporters pay close attention to what can be gleaned from liability in-
surance law and economics, and sometimes use the language of law and eco-
nomics to explain a legal rule, but those gleanings and that language play a 
supporting role.  
  
 139 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) (concluding that “the 
presence of at least some consumer search in a market creates the possibility of a ‘pecuniary externality’: 
persons who search sometimes protect non-searchers from overreaching firms.” (footnote omitted)). 
 140 See e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Infor-
mation Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006); Justin Sydnor, (Over)insuring 
Modest Risks, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 177 (2010). See generally, Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, 
Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The Importance of Equilibrium Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 491 (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds., 2014). 
 141 When the project was a Principles project, the draft made a distinction in some rules between 
large commercial policyholders and other policyholders. That distinction reflected our understanding that 
the market failures are more pervasive in consumer liability insurance markets than commercial liability 
insurance markets. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1 (T.D. Draft No. 1 2014) 
(defining large commercial policyholder). That distinction was dropped when the project because a Re-
statement because of a lack of support in the common law. It remains a sensible distinction for a legislature 
or an administrative agency to make, consistent with the concept that ALI Principles projects are directed 
at legislatures and administrative agencies rather than courts. 
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That supporting role is, however, an important one; and we heartily en-
courage our law and economics colleagues and the liability insurance indus-
try to contribute to the debate. All we ask is that those contributions rest on 
a solid empirical foundation.142 Indeed, were the liability insurance industry 
to make claims data publicly available, there would be many empirical legal 
studies scholars eager to use the data in their research. That would contribute 
not only to our understanding of the comparative effects of different liability 
insurance law rules but also to our understanding of the civil justice system 
of which liability insurance is such an integral part.  
  
 142 See Richard Thaler, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present and Future, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 
1577, 1597 (2016) (“[I]t is time to fully embrace what I would call evidence-based economics. . . . In that 
sense, I think it is time to stop thinking about behavioral economics as some kind of revolution. Rather, 
behavioral economics should be considered simply a return to the kind of open-minded, intuitively moti-
vated discipline that was invented by Adam Smith and augmented by increasingly powerful statistical 
tools and datasets.”). 
